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Ready When You Are  
A Correspondence On Claire Elise Katz’s Levinas And 
The Crisis Of Humanism 
Jeffrey A. Bernstein  
College of the Holy Cross 
Claire E. Katz 
Texas A&M University 
Dear Claire,  
Thanks to you, and to the editors at the Journal of French And 
Francophone Philosophy, for your willingness to engage in this dialogue about 
your wonderful book.  It is certainly, within the context of a journal, an 
unconventional approach; I believe, however, that it may allow for a 
discussion that does justice to the full range of topics in your work. 
For me, one of the most impressive aspects of Levinas And The Crisis Of 
Humanism is its ability to move simultaneously along two distinct vectors:  
(1) from close and rigorous textual exegesis of Levinas’s work, through 
historical discussions concerning the philosophy of education, to concrete 
discussions having to do with the pedagogy of childhood education, and (2) 
from Levinas’s essays on education, through his readings of the Talmud, to 
his philosophical works (i.e., Totality and Infinity and Otherwise than Being).  I 
am not aware of any other text about Levinas that exhibits both the depth 
and breadth that Levinas does.  For this, Levinas studies, Jewish philosophy, 
and the philosophy of education owe you a debt of gratitude. 
In order to best give readers a sense of your book, I thought I might 
proceed with a long initial letter—this (I hope) will allow for a horizon to 
open up in which a number of themes and topics related to your book can be 
explored.   
That your book is not primarily, or solely, a book on Levinas can be 
seen from your suspicion that the tradition of philosophy which views 
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education towards ethics along the lines of a rational process of developing 
inter-subjectivity and relationality (towards one’s society, culture, and 
world) is radically inadequate:   
In spite of claims to the contrary, it is not clear to me that 
reason will deliver the one correct answer.  Through an 
appeal to economics, pragmatics, or familial obligations, 
reason could easily offer a justification for either claim:  
self-interest or care for the Other.  The answer at which we 
arrive and the one we choose for ourselves is already 
conditioned by the things we value and how we 
understand ourselves as subjects who are rational and 
free.  From a Levinasian standpoint, an individual will 
only part with her money in the service of others (without 
benefit to herself, e.g., a tax break) if she has first turned 
toward the Other—and reason does not necessarily 
motivate this turn to occur. (6)   
To the extent that your claim indicates the limits of rationality from the 
standpoint of the ethical, it inhabits a respectable modern European 
philosophical lineage including Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, Heidegger, 
Horkheimer, Adorno, Benjamin, Arendt, Foucault, and Derrida.  You, 
however, proceed further.  You are satisfied neither with a merely 
descriptive account of the limits of reason for ethics nor with a purely critical 
(or negative) account detailing reason’s failures to deal with violence.  
Description and critique not only cannot bring us to ethics, but they can (in 
fact) be co-opted by the same impulses towards isolation, alienation, and 
indifference towards suffering that you see as pandemic in modern life.  This 
is true even for discourses that attempt to provide positive, rights-based 
accounts of ethics:  “The discussion of rights is already at a level of discourse 
that has [on Levinasian terms] forgotten the ethical, the face-to-face 
responsibility that I have for another” (6).  Put simply, if one doesn’t start 
with the ethical, there is no guarantee that one will reach it:  “I disagree with 
the view that this intersubjectivity automatically yields the normative claim 
of responsibility.  Levinas wants an ethical relation that is prior to my even 
having a world” (7). 
This view places your work in the solid tradition of the best Levinas 
scholarship.  Where (in my view) your work’s originality shines through, 
however, is in the dialogue you set up between Levinas’s educational 
writings, his Jewish texts, and his phenomenological studies.  In fact, you go 
further:  Levinas’s writings resist (at least to a great extent) attempts to 
compartmentalize them into ‘Jewish’ and ‘philosophical’:   
I maintain that not only is there a productive conversation 
to be had when these bodies of writings are engaged, but 
also that the Jewish writings are misnamed as a body of 
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writing.  Many of the ideas Levinas expresses in these 
essays are written in a secular register—and that would 
make sense since many in his audience are non-religious 
Jews . . . I take the Jewish writings seriously.  I do not 
think they are simply ancillary to his philosophical project; 
I believe instead that they lie at the center of and disclose 
what he believes most firmly. (17)   
By juxtaposing the different aspects of Levinas’s corpus, you bring to life a 
normative ethical theory (stemming from Jewish sources) that serves as a 
pedagogical model for the creation of ethical subjectivity.  This, in no way, 
means that one has to be Jewish in order to undergo this educational 
experience—far from it.  But that its sources come from the tradition of 
Hebraic humanism is also not inconsequential to your Levinasian project:   
This book demonstrates that the function of Levinas’s 
philosophical project is in part to persuade his readers, to 
persuade those outside the community of Israel that this 
subjectivity, this new humanism, is for everyone.  
[Levinas] believes that this humanism is Jewish in origin, 
that it is the unique gift to humanity for which Judaism 
was created, and he believes that Jewish education is the 
means by which this humanism is cultivated . . . Insofar as 
one adopts this view of subjectivity, that person 
participates in the universal dimension of Judaism. (16) 
Here, then, are the two questions that kept arising for me as I read your 
book:  (1) How is Levinas’s conception of education Jewish? and (2) How is 
Levinas’s conception of education normative (or how can sacrifice be taught)? 
In asking the first question, I intend neither to essentalize Judaism nor 
to simply protect it from ‘outside influences.’ But, if the normative character 
of Levinasian subjectivity lies in its imperative to put the other before 
oneself—that the other is always already prior to one’s own egoity—and 
that this should be the basis for a humanist education of children, my 
question is:  how or why is this conception of education Jewish and not 
rather Christian?  Put more baldly:  it would seem that the priority of 
sacrifice defines the character of Christianity more than Judaism.  Please 
notice what I am not saying:  I do not believe that Judaism has no conception 
of ethics, of responsibility, of helping the poor, infirmed and needy.  But I 
would hold that, for Judaism, these do not presuppose the priority of the 
other as the condition for one’s selfhood.  I also do not believe that 
Christianity, with its emphasis on sacrifice, emerged ex nihilo.  Levinas is 
correct when (in “Being Jewish” [1947]) he claims that Christianity is, in 
large measure, also Judaism.  However, there is a major difference between 
the conception of charity (or better, righteousness) in Judaism and its 
analogue in Christianity. 
1 2 6  |  R e a d y  W h e n  Y o u  A r e  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXII, No 2 (2014)  |  http://www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2014.661 
The Christian conception of charity comes from the Latin caritas, itself a 
translation (in the Vulgate) of the Greek agape, love of God.   This love is to 
be understood in both the objective and subjective senses—i.e., it is the love 
that is appropriately given to God as well as the love that God gives to 
God’s creatures.  Charity, thus understood, is not a virtue or state that arises 
in or from human nature.  As fallen, humans depend on God’s grace 
through which they receive this virtue as a (in the words of Thomas) divine 
infusion.  It is through God’s self-emptying movement in the form of Jesus’s 
life and sacrifice that humans come to learn (see?  hear?) the sacrifice that 
properly characterizes charity.  That sacrifice shows humans both that they 
are not autonomous agents (that they cannot achieve this virtue on their 
own) and that they ought to attempt an approximation of it in their own 
lives.  Thus, the concept of caritas carries within itself a normative element 
that shows humans their natural limits as well as that which they ought to 
strive for (i.e., their ultimate Good). 
By contrast, the Jewish conception of charity/righteousness is expressed 
in the Hebrew word, tzedakah.  This is the feminine of the word tzedek, which 
means justice. But what, then, is tzedakah?  Charity, in this sense, means 
helping the suffering of the other in the sense of setting things right (thus, 
righteousness).  One helps the other because one’s own claim on life is no 
greater than the other’s—but also no less.  And while (for Maimonides) one 
ought, within the context of charity, give the best one has, one ought not 
jeapordize one’s own situation in the act of giving.  One thinks here of 
Hillel’s statement in Pirke Avot (which I here paraphrase):  in a world bereft 
of humans, strive to be a human.  And it is in this sense that Jews are called 
to “mend the world (tikkun olam).”  This, however, also means that humans 
relate to each other as “another self” (this is as much a general Talmudic 
principle as it is a staple of Aristotle’s ethics—in this respect, Jerusalem and 
Athens are quite close).  One helps the other because the other is like oneself.  
One sets a place for the stranger at the Passover Seder because Jews were 
strangers in Egypt.  The examples flow—but you know all this. 
To reiterate, my point is not that Levinas’s conception is deficient 
because it resonates with what I take to be a more Christian emphasis on 
sacrifice.  Rather, I find the question of Judaism in Levinas to be so 
compelling (and maddening) that I want to provoke this discussion in you. 
My question, in other words, is:  how is the Levinasian conception of 
substitution (insofar as it appears, to me, to bear a kinship to sacrifice) 
Jewish rather than Christian?  If egoity (and the laws regulating it) is 
precisely the problem which both inundates Western (Greco-philosophical) 
education and prevents ethical subjectivity from arising, wouldn’t the 
resources found in Christianity (and its interpretation of the Hebrew Bible) 
provide better materials for constructing a theory of oneself-for-the-other?  
At the institution where I work (College of the Holy Cross), one of the 
primary slogans used to express our mission is “Men and women for 
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others.”  Would “Men and women mending the world” work as well?  
Doesn’t “mending” suggest restoring something back to its original state of 
health?  
While I do not, as a Jew, feel at ease in raising this suggestion, my 
question compels me to do so: Why isn’t the exemplary image for Levinasian 
ethics the Crucifixion without the Resurrection?     
My second question is less “religious” insofar as it asks about the 
impulses of ethical action in both Judaism and Christianity.  Whether one 
understands charity/righteousness in a Thomistic or a Maimonidean 
framework, it is characterized by a certain kind of excess.  In the Summa 
Theologica, Thomas’ argues that infused virtue is precisely extra-normative 
insofar as it does not simply derive from God’s eternal law as it manifests 
itself to any rational being in nature—it remains solely in the province of 
God’s grace.  At the very end of Maimonides’s Guide of the Perplexed, 
Maimonides holds that the scriptural virtue-terms righteousness (tzedakah), 
judgment (mishpat) and lovingkindness (hesed) are to be understood as 
excessive insofar as they are not evaluated—as are other virtues—according 
to an Aristotelian conception of the mean of an action.  If we, for the 
moment, take Thomas and Maimonides as representatives of their respective 
religions, we can say that the exemplary manifestation of ethical behavior – 
charity - involves excess.  Put differently, ethics finds its culmination in 
behavior that isn’t simply rule-based or law-driven.  If this is true, then how 
can it form the basis of a normative theory?   
You are very clear and admirably honest on this issue (and for this, I 
will need to skip to a later section of your book):  “My point here is not to 
say that I think Levinas is wrong in his promotion of a new subjectivity; in 
fact, I think he is right.  Rather, my point is that Levinasian ethics is indeed 
difficult, maybe even impossible.  My concern is that many commentators 
have made Levinas’s ethics seem easy or natural” (148).  I very much share 
your concern over the “naturalization” (and, thus, banalization) of 
Levinasian ethics. My concern here is whether one can institutionalize—and 
thus normalize—something like sacrifice. 
Beyond my concern over whether something like sacrifice can in fact be 
universalized, I wonder whether it even makes sense to speak of sacrifice or 
substitution as a norm at all. 
To say that Judaism is a religion of law is not to say that it is a literal, 
carnal, religion; it is to acknowledge that (apart from its 19th century German 
re-invention as a “faith-tradition”) it is (in the words of Yeshayahu 
Leibowitz) a “prosaic” religion.  It would be difficult to illustrate this in a 
way that did not romanticize the 613 commandments and prohibitions 
(many of which, in any case, were rendered historically obsolete, and many 
of which are not observed by non-Orthodox Jews like myself).  Suffice it to 
say that, for me, Judaism’s strength is to provide a framework for daily life; 
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this is done through legal structure, interpretive commentary, and teaching 
on nearly every aspect of one’s life.  Even the “excessive virtues” mentioned 
by Maimonides are indexed to the more conventional moral virtues (and the 
Aristotelian mean which serves as their context of acquisition). 
How does one institutionally learn how to place the other before 
oneself? If education is a process of inculcating norms, Levinasian ethics 
would call for the normalizing or universalizing of the 
substitutive/sacrificial impulse.  Can sacrifice even be thought in normative 
terms?  At stake is not so much whether a child holds the door for another 
child (that, in any case, is a practice long accepted and for reasons that are 
disturbingly compatible with status quo conventional perceptions about 
gender, etc.).  Rather, what makes someone take their life into their own 
hands for reasons of saving others?  Again, the appropriate image for this 
kind of sacrifice is one that, as I mentioned above, seems to me neither 
normal nor Jewish. 
I hope that my all too broad characterizations of your Introduction, 
Levinas, Judaism, and Christianity have not missed the essential thrust of 
your project (one with which, I hope you see, I am very sympathetic).  If 
interpretation weren’t in any sense violent, it would be simple recognition of 
the same.  That said, I hope the violence I may have done here is not of the 
ir-responsible kind. 




Thank you for these very detailed, thoughtful, and provocative 
comments.  I fear that my response will not be as long or detailed as you 
might hope, simply because there might be an answer that is not as complex 
as one might imagine. Both questions are connected by a view that what 
Levinas is proposing might actually be more Christian than Jewish. So in the 
first question you ask why Jewish education is Jewish and then in the case of 
the second question you ask why not the Crucifixion (without the 
resurrection of course).  I will try to answer them separately, but I can see 
how addressing them might blur my response between the two.  
We have to remember that Levinas uses the term Jewish to refer to a 
particular ethical spirit, not necessarily the particular mode of religious 
practice that would include following the 613 commandments. Thus, by 
expanding the definition—or if you will, secularizing it—he opens this 
particular question—why is it Jewish?  
I believe it is Jewish—on multiple levels—for several reasons. First, and 
foremost, his model of education is in fact specifically tied to the education 
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one receives in a Jewish day school. So on a basic level—the students are 
learning through the Jewish sacred texts; they are learning Hebrew; they are 
learning Jewish law, they are learning to read Jewishly, meaning 
Midrashically. But on a different level, Levinas believes that this education 
also orients them Jewishly by raising them to be responsible for the other.  
He argues that this is the fundamental and sustained message of the stories 
in the Hebrew Bible.  It is the one non-negotiable, if you will. The one 
message that Midrash does not undo.  Can other religions, including and 
maybe even especially Christianity, teach in this way or emphasize this 
message? Sure, but then one might say they are simply teaching Judaism or 
teaching a message that is fundamentally, or originally Jewish.  It is not that 
it is only Jewish that makes it Jewish—it is that it was Jewish first.    
The problem I encountered in writing this book was precisely the way 
in which Levinas outlines this Jewish education such that I had great 
difficulty thinking about how a comparable non-religious, non-Jewish 
education would look.  There is a “warrant” within the Jewish community, 
assuming one has agreed to send his/her child to Jewish day school, that 
allows the school to teach in a particular kind of way—to use religious 
language, for example. What would warrant that in the public schools? How 
would one talk about responsibility for the other?  How would we teach 
reading in a way that emphasizes Midrash?  And could we teach in such a 
way that the material had a direct bearing on the community in which those 
learners belong—as we might see within the Jewish day school and the 
Jewish community?   
With regard to the second question—why not the Crucifixion?  Why the 
Crucifixion?  A sacrifice for no one in particular? For the sins of man?  This 
seems so far from Judaism—except for maybe the horrible jokes told about 
Jewish mothers! I don’t believe that Levinas is advocating for sacrifice.  I do 
however believe he is advocating for the development of a self that will be 
open to the interruption by the other.  I also believe that he believes that 
being interrupted should entail doing something—otherwise he is simply 
describing the world we already inhabit—a world where we encounter the 
suffering of the other and repeatedly do nothing about it. It is not clear why 
he would spill so much ink describing the obvious failure of Enlightenment 
ethics and humanism that has become increasingly narcissistic and less 
about a responsibility for others. The Crucifixion is about self-sacrifice for 
individual salvation.  This is not Levinas’s, nor would I say Judaism’s, 
concern.  He is not interested in advocating martyrdom. Rather, he sees 
sacrifice—not the sacrifice of the Other but rather a self-sacrifice as the 
possibility of ethics. It is the extreme—it is held out as a liminal case that 
simply exposes that ethics is real.  
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Dear Claire, 
As I promised, I will keep this response far shorter than my initial one.  
There’s a wonderful irony about two Jews discussing and debating the 
meaning of the Crucifixion that I can’t let go without comment.  Perhaps this 
has something to do with the secularized form of Rabbinic/Midrashic 
exegesis about which you write.  Perhaps this also is an example of how this 
mode of exegesis can occur even in an “other” context aside from Jewish day 
school.  Given his essays dealing with Christianity, Levinas (I imagine) 
could only have welcomed this. 
Nonetheless, I do want to persist:  I think that the main feature of the 
image of the Crucifixion sans resurrection is precisely its illustration of 
sacrifice for the other.  The resurrection is the image par excellence of the 
rewards of individual salvation (a concept foreign to traditional Judaism as 
well as to Levinas).  This is, clearly, a religious image—but one that seems to 
provide the normative thrust which you seek in your own construal of 
Levinasian ethical subjectivity.  Would such sacrifice be “for the sins of 
man”? A lot depends upon what we mean by “sin” and “man.”   
The former couldn’t simply be understood in a doctrinal context; but I 
wonder if the problem of individualism (in modernity) isn’t itself a 
secularized version of the egoism that comes to sight in (and, I would argue, 
dominates) the traditional Christian discourse of Original Sin.  What I would 
like to draw attention to is that such a condition (doctrinally or secularly 
construed) is impervious to even the best meaning critical resources.   I think 
you give a very interesting example of the difference between (1) the simple 
critique of blind, indifferent individualism (and its potentially horrific 
consequences) and (2) what it means to go further than (or anterior to?) such 
critique:   
Although the critical thinking that Adorno advocates may 
help someone resist authoritarian thinking, critical 
thinking alone will not help someone become a better 
person who resists authoritarian rule.  Levinas focuses his 
attention on cultivating a subjectivity that will not only 
prevent the conditions that create a murderous self in the 
first place but who will also respond accordingly if such 
conditions are created.  Adorno’s prescription, though it is 
necessary, is not sufficient. (105) 
Adorno understands the critical moment to be a secularized version of 
the Jewish ban on divine representation as it gets applied to the realm of 
ethics and politics.  It cannot, in principle, cultivate a different subjectivity 
because (paraphrasing his argument in Negative Dialectics) it was precisely 
the attempt to do so that led to the horrors of Auschwitz.  Put differently, the 
20th century was filled with sacrifice—of the idolatrous kind.  If Levinas is 
calling for an understanding of selfhood in which one’s subjectivity comes to 
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light as always already standing accused before the other, I can’t think of a 
better image than the Crucifixion.  I am, however, open to suggestions. 
As for “man,” it would certainly be a mistake to hold that Levinas 
understands ethics as either an empirical-historical or Kantian-style 
transcendental structure of human being.  But is it false to claim that his 
ethical project has universal scope (albeit emerging from a particular set of 
texts and approaches)?  I think that the entire problematic of alterity hangs 
on this question.  On the one hand, it becomes difficult to even articulate a 
discourse of the other “that isn’t co-opted by the same” if the answer is ‘yes’.  
If the answer is ‘no’, what are we to make of Levinas’s dedication of 
Otherwise Than Being:  “To the memory of those who were closest among the 
six million assassinated by the National Socialists, and of the millions on 
millions of all confessions and all nations, victims of the same hatred of the 
other man, the same anti-semitism”?  Levinas may be rejecting modern 
Western humanism but, as you show in your last chapter “Humanism 
Found”, he doesn’t reject humanism tout court.  (In fact, such humanism 
couldn’t rest content with the gender-bias in the word “man”)  I may be 
reading it too literally, but the constellation of terms used in the 
dedication—“confession,” “same,” “all nations”—suggests a determinate 
image (rather than a ban on images).   
In fact, there can’t be a simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to the question of alterity 
with respect to universality.   I take it that, for Levinas, ‘universality’ means 
something like ‘universal substitution,’— we, all of us, are already 
responsible for the other (as others are responsible for “other” others).  In 
this way, Levinas is able to fuse (or, mediate?) universality and singularity 
without disturbing either.  We, all of us, are singular and—as singular—are 
concretely and determinately responsible for the other (in the other’s 
singularity).  I promise that this will be the last time I harp on this, but what 
image does justice to the example of the single individual sacrificing for all 
the others? 
The Crucifixion is not without its own origins in the Hebrew Bible—one 
thinks, first off of Abraham and Isaac.  I mention this only to turn to your 
second point— that the ethical stance constitutive of Levinas “was Jewish 
first.” So my next question has to do with the claim of “firstness” and 
whether (or how) it fits with Levinas’ project. 
As you describe it, Levinas’s ethical project is not concerned simply 
with intersubjectivity.  This is because the origin of subjectivity (in the 
relation to the other) is irreducible to subjective consciousness (what Adorno 
calls “identity thinking”).  For this reason, one never gets “behind” 
subjectivity by remaining with subjectivity.  Another way to say this might 
be that Levinas’s ethical project cannot be grounded in empirical psychology, 
politics, sociology, or history.  But there’s the rub:  if history cannot be the 
grounds for a Levinasian ethics of substitution, how could it (or why ought 
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it) matter to Levinas that the ethical project is/was Jewish first?  Differently 
put, substitution is not grounded in a positive principle—it is an-archic.  
How can the firstness of Judaism be reconciled with the an-archy of 
substitution?  If (1) Judaism is not significant as the historical origin of ethics, 
and if (2) substitution can be described in any number of manners, then 
what is the import and status of Judaism for Levinas’s ethics?   
Your responses to these will help me better inquire into the rich 
discussions of Midrash and childhood education that form such a large part 
of your book.  
 
Hi, Jeff (forgive the informality…) 
You pose an interesting and difficult question. But, I think the difficulty 
might lie in the way that you frame this question: “what image does justice 
to the example of the single individual sacrificing for all the others?”  
Levinas is not concerned with an individual sacrificing his or her life in the 
abstract. Nor is he concerned with an individual sacrificing his/her life for 
all others, as we see in the Crucifixion. Rather, staying with the ethical 
relation, the face to face is about the self’s responsibility to an individual 
other.  My point in talking about subjectivity in the way that I do is to 
emphasize that he could not have spilt this much ink simply to say, yes, I 
was interrupted by the other but basically “fuck you, I don’t feel like 
responding to you.”  That has been the ugly history that led to the Shoah.  
Rather, I argue that his view of subjectivity, the one that describes the face of 
the other as an interruption, includes a response to that face—a positive 
response. That is, it is not simply a negative ethics—one shalt not harm the 
other, one shalt not murder, but not murdering entails feeding the other. He 
has a more robust view of what it means to respond, and yes, it might mean 
resisting the Nazi.   
I think Levinas’s ethics reveals that this is not “natural.” We are not 
born able to do this. This is why he turns to Jewish education. Levinas is 
working against the conatus essendi, the drive to persevere or survive as the 
most dominant force in our lives. He believes that the possibility that one 
might sacrifice one’s life for another works against the conatus essendi. While 
it is the case that many argue that the sacrifice of one’s life for a child might 
simply be another evolutionary trait, that it’s the survival of one’s genes, not 
necessarily one’s own body that is at work, this will not explain why one 
would sacrifice one’s life for an unrelated person.  Moreover, that there 
might be an originary evolutionary explanation at work does not undermine 
the possibility of a moral or ethical motivation also.  The need for education 
then goes against the view that we are beings who are only driven by a need 
to survive and would do anything to persist.  
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So, I understand why you move to the Crucifixion as the image.  But 
neither Levinas nor I are advocating that people sacrifice their lives for the 
Other.  Indeed, he is clear about this point when he discusses the issue of 
maternity and women dying in childbirth.  He does not advocate that 
women sacrifice their lives, but there is the reality that women do take this 
risk each time they are pregnant.  So he is not suggesting that women should 
die in childbirth. Nor is he suggesting that anyone should sacrifice his/her 
life for another. Rather, that this is possible, that we take these risks, that 
people on occasion do indeed sacrifice their lives for another, makes possible 
the ethical and thus provides a normative basis for being ethical—for 
putting another before ourselves, though, circling back around, he does not 
prescribe this kind of sacrifice.  It is worth noting that the command to be 
fruitful and multiply is a commandment only for men.  The rabbis did not 
believe it was ethical to command women to become pregnant knowing that 
pregnancy and childbirth carries with it a risk of life.  
It is an extreme; it betrays the nihilist position. But he does not advocate 
this as a normative view. But insofar as he describes the ethical relation as 
one of interruption and insofar as that interruption entails a response, then 
something positive—a positive action—must be part of this.   
 
Dear Claire, 
For your Levinas, the question of education in a Jewish mode seems (to 
me) to operate between two poles.  First, there is the attitudinal pole (as 
exemplified in Jewish prayer):  “one of the most interesting parts of Jewish 
prayer is the emphasis on ‘being ready’ or readying oneself.  That is, there 
are prayers or blessings that are said simply to ready oneself for saying the 
central prayers.  It is impossible to ignore the repeated use of hineni, ‘Here I 
am,’ in the Hebrew Bible—most notably uttered by Noah and Abraham in 
order to signal their readiness to serve.  Jewish prayer reflects an instruction 
in readiness.”(155) Insofar as this readiness is to be thought as an openness 
to the other, to a placing the other before oneself, to the “after you” about 
which Levinas speaks in Otherwise Than Being, one might employ the phrase 
“ready when you are” to express this thought.  The sense of this phrase 
would be the exact opposite of its conventional meaning (i.e., I’ll be ready 
after you’ve already acted).  Instead, it suggests my readiness as a response 
to the prior occurrence of others. 
Second, there is the practical pole (as exemplified in Midrashic/\ 
exegesis):  “The great books of Judaism do not cleanse human life of the 
complexities that comprise human relations.  The stories and the 
commentaries demand rigor and attentiveness to them.  They will not 
dispense answers easily or simply.  But they will offer us guidance if we pay 
close attention, and indeed our job is to figure out how these stories of the 
past can teach us something about our present-day situation . . . We must, 
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therefore, return to Rabbinic exegesis, which made the texts speak . . . In this 
return, the text becomes a teacher, or at the very least, a source of teaching 
rather than a mere object of study.  To see the text in this way is to practice 
Judaism in its original spirit”(113).  Put differently, along with readiness, the 
openness to the differences in meaning and connotation that characterize 
Rabbinic exegesis—the openness to the “saying” of the text—can help 
instruct us as to the difference of (and respect owed to) the “saying” of 
others. 
In adopting a position within these two poles (as I understand you) we 
are better able to both teach and learn in a manner that—heeding Levinas’s 
warnings about the status quo of Enlightenment individualism—amounts to 
an actualization of the possibility for a different manner of living.  
Education, therefore, “does not simply make the new possible, but is itself 
the emergence of the new” (167). 
Again, I want to acknowledge the bold honesty of your text (faithful, let 
it be said in passing, to the prohibition on predicting the messianic age) in 
noting your uncertainty about the possibility of whether Levinas’s 
conception of education could serve as the opening for a new kind of 
subjectivity.  That said, it seems to me that Levinas’s conception of 
subjectivity—as based on readiness for service and openness to the saying of 
others—presupposes either (1) an already constituted Enlightenment 
subjectivity which would be need to be interrupted or (2) a ‘neutral’ self that 
could, at an appropriately young age, be impressed and informed by 
attitudes and practices.   
I wonder, however, whether there are additional complications. It may 
be that contemporary diagnostic models dealing with the challenges 
endured through childhood (e.g., Aspberger’s, ADD) are themselves a 
product of the Enlightenment individualist subjectivity that you and Levinas 
wish to call into question.  That said, does Levinas’s conception of Jewish 
education—as it deals with the teaching of empathy, or, hinenei—take into 
account children who experience large deficits, or large influxes, of affect?  
This is by no means to suggest that such children are unable to learn 
empathy; it is simply to wonder how, more precisely, Levinasian education 
can accommodate wide variation in the strengths (and challenges) of 
children.  Perhaps my phrasing just now is errant insofar as Levinas does 
not intend his conception to be a ‘plan’—perhaps, the idea of a plan is itself 
also a product of Enlightenment individualism.  If, then, every child is a 
singular other, how does teaching and learning occur? 
At stake in this is nothing less than how Levinasian education might 
occur.  That my formulation of the question is lacking ought not (I hope) 
take away from the exigency of the issue. 
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Hi Jeff, 
First thanks again for these thoughtful questions.  I do not know if I can 
answer them adequately—or if I have answered adequately the others you 
have posed previously.  But let me see what I can do to move the 
conversation forward.  The question you pose about the Enlightenment 
subject reminds me of a general problem in philosophy: the problem—or 
paradox—of origins.  We see this problem in Plato’s Republic when the 
children are rounded up and the educational process is to begin—Who are 
the teachers? Who has the wisdom to identify the would-be future 
guardians? It appears again in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics—Who is the 
phronemos? Who can habituate the children?  And again in Rousseau’s Emile 
with the magical tutor.   
Levinas is arguing for an interrupted Enlightenment subject. But I do 
not think that precludes the possibility that he is also arguing to return to, or 
reclaim, a model of education that might precede the Enlightenment both 
temporally (literally with regard to years) and “ontologically.”  That is, he 
cannot dispense with the Enlightenment subject—it is the subjectivity he 
needs to make political decisions, to deliberate.  Nor does he want a 
subjectivity that is merely interrupted.  Otherwise, even the Enlightenment 
subject can act in his/her own self-interest—with justification—or simply 
say, “you are not of my concern.” Interruption does not guarantee a 
response to the other.  His phrase that one should not go before God—or the 
other—with empty hands in his essay on Buber is telling. If being 
interrupted can still allow us to go on our way and not pay any mind to the 
other, have we advanced?  Is his ethical project strictly phenomenological in 
the sense of describing the interruption and then merely hoping that we 
might do something for the other rather than not? That seems like a lot of 
ink to spill for mere hope.  So I do not think he is suggesting that we return 
to a time before the Enlightenment. But I do think he believes that what 
might have given the Enlightenment subject more moral force has been 
erased and it requires a new way of educating, a new way of subjectivity 
developing for this response to the other to take shape.  
The second point you raise is complicated, and I do not know whether I 
can answer it.  I tried to address something similar—a subjectivity that 
might fall outside of Levinas’s ethical project—in my essay “East of Eden.” I 
do not know whether this educational project can accommodate all 
children—or if it should.  I do think though that an educational process that 
assumes egoism at the center will not help us prevent, resolve, or address 
the violence that concerns him.  
So finally—just to circle back to one of the central themes of the book, I 
maintain that learning is best done socially, not individually. And this has 
implications forwards and backwards. That is to say that our view of 
subjectivity—as autonomous, self-sufficient, having “sprung up from the 
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ground like mushrooms” (to quote Hobbes)—has implications for how we 
organize schools and emphasize the best way to learn. In turn, this kind of 
educational model perpetuates the mythology that we are autonomous, self-
sufficient, and so forth. Adorno’s radio broadcast, “Education After 
Auschwitz,” claims that the premier demand upon all education is that 
Auschwitz never happen again. I agree with that statement, though I do not 
think that the model Adorno sketches will arrive at the place he wants. 
However, in a commentary on another of Adorno’s radio broadcasts—one 
that is more explicitly a dialogue between Adorno and his friend Hellmut 
Becker—Robert French and Jem Thomas offer an interesting perspective on 
what Adorno might have had in mind.  They argue that philosophy itself 
has a history of emphasizing the significant role of friendship, explicitly and 
implicitly, in the activity of philosophy.  The authors indicate that this 
particular point is evident not only in Adorno’s conversation with Becker, 
which allows them both to be playful, spontaneous, and honest, but also in 
the Frankfurt School which was founded not only on friendship but also a 
shared experience, traumatic as that experience was. My discussion of the 
Talmudic approach to learning, which models the hermeneutic dimension of 
reading, complements this point. It takes this point further by claiming that 
this very mode of learning cultivates not only the resistance to authoritarian 
thinking that occupies much of Adorno’s own thought but also the 
cultivation of a responsible subject who will respond to the injustice—not 
simply be able to identify it as such.  It is this kind of subjectivity that I 
believe Levinas describes—not the one who is only interrupted but also the 
one who responds.  
 
